



# PROGRAM FOR EMERGING LEADERS' NEWSLETTER



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## Contents

**Director's Corner**  
Page 1

**Speakers Recommend**  
Pages 1

**PEL Members' Good News**  
Page 2

**BIS and Export Controls:  
A WMD Perspective**  
Page 2

**Winter Workshop**  
Pages 3-4

**Notes on Senior Mentors' Observations**  
Pages 4-5

**Ken Rapuano's Observations**  
Page 5

**Winter Workshop in Pictures**  
Pages 6-7

**Winter Workshop: Survey Says!**  
Page 8

## Director's Corner

Since you received the last newsletter, we held a very successful Winter Workshop on 7-8 February 2013, which focused on biological weapons. The workshop kicked off a new arrangement in which Winter Workshops will address one of the three weapons of mass destruction – biological, chemical, or nuclear – on a rotating basis, so that over the course of a member's three-year term, he or she will have the opportunity to take a deeper look at each threat. There are a number of articles about the workshop I hope you will enjoy.

The Senior Mentors' comments were as sage and trenchant as ever, therefore I have included my notes from the final panel in the newsletter. Mr. Ken Rapuano expanded on his thoughts

from the end of the second day and they are included separately. The articles by PEL 05 members, Ms. Tina Carlile and Maj Scott Stanford, give a good summary of each day's events. There is also an article based on the responses to our survey about the workshop as well as some great photos of members and speakers.

You will see something new in this newsletter: a short article about the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) by Mr. Colin May, PEL 04. Future newsletters will include articles by PEL members explaining what their organizations do vis à vis weapons of mass destruction. If you are interested in writing one please let me know.

On 1 April the Senior Mentors, Dr. Reichart,



and I will meet together to choose this class. We look forward to welcoming the new members to NDU for Summer Immersion, 17-21 June 2013.

Finally, some of you have asked how furloughs will affect PEL. The answer is we don't know yet. However, WMD Center staff are DoD civilians and will be subject to furloughs, if they occur. In that case we may be forced to make changes to the program. If this happens, I will lay out those changes in the next newsletter. In the meantime, have a happy and healthy spring!

## Winter Workshop Speakers Recommend...

- Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman, and Steven Kotler, "Hacking the President's DNA," *The Atlantic*, November 2012 (<http://bit.ly/PRKEeT>)
- Richard Danzig, "Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security," CNAS, October 2011 (<http://bit.ly/s6XDoA>)
- Nassim Nicholas Taleb. *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.
- National Research Council of the National Academies. *The Unique U.S.-Russian Relationship in Biological Science and Biotechnology: Recent Experience and Future Directions*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013.

## PEL Members' Good News

☉ On 1 May 2012 Frank Landry, PEL 04, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF.

☉ Maj William "Bay" Dobbins welcomed his third child, Alexandra Penelope Dobbins, on 6 September 2012. He and his family are relocating to the NCR where he will begin work in Installations and Logistics at Marine Corps Headquarters. We are looking forward to seeing him at more local events!

☉ On 3 December 2012 Capt Matthew Butler, PEL 05, and his wife Becky welcomed their first child.

☉ Chris Forrest was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the USAF on 1 February 2013. He will be the Director of Operations for the Operations Support Squadron at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.

☉ On 27 April 2013, Ms. Katie Reid, PEL 04, will marry MAJ James LeBlanc in Berryville, Virginia.

☉ Maj Eric Thompson, PEL 05, has been selected to be the next "Chief of Codes" at Minot AFB starting on 3 June 2013.

☉ CDR Amy Larson, PEL 05, was selected as a Fulbright fellow to study for her LL.M. in International Law during the 2013-2014 academic year at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.

☉ Ms. Seeba Pepper, PEL 02, is engaged to be married to Mr. Kristopher Reams on 25 May 2013 at Keswick Vineyards, VA.

☉ In June MAJ Lino Miani, PEL 03, will be the keynote lecturer for the Dark Networks segment of the "Catalysts for Change" course at the NATO Special Operations School in June.

☉ Maj Jennifer Garrison, PEL 03, will serve as the Healthcare Administrator for the 20<sup>th</sup> Medical Group at Shaw AFB beginning on 30 June 2013.

☉ LCDR Guy "Bus" Snodgrass, PEL 05, was selected to command a fighter squadron. He will begin familiarization training later this year and take command in 2014.

## BIS and Export Controls: A WMD Perspective

### Mr. Colin May, PEL 04

The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) is the U.S. Government agency with primary jurisdiction over the export of dual-use items. Dual-use items, as defined by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), are those products which have military or strategic uses as well as commercial applications. The agency's mission statement is to "advance U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership."

BIS "protect[s] the security of the United States, which includes its national security, economic security, cyber security, and homeland security" and works with U.S. firms and other Government agencies to analyze the Defense Industrial Base through its Office of Technology Evaluation (OTE). In regulating dual-use controls, the Bureau also closely monitors commodities to ensure they are not misused. For example, there are controls for products relating to crime control and regional stability. BIS seeks to promote a strong and vibrant defense industrial base that enables the nation to maintain its military superiority against adversaries.

BIS has an important role in preventing the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by our adversaries. It regulates licensing of dual-use exports and investigates possible violations of export regulations. Its criminal and administrative investigative role serves to deter and detect violations.

In the WMD realm, BIS works closely with other government agencies to prevent WMD proliferation. It also works through the U.S. delegations to the multilateral control regimes, including the Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). BIS administers the industry compliance program for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It also has a Chemical and Biological Division that handles export licensing and administration for toxins, biological materials, and the regulated biological equipment that are subject to the EAR. By working closely with U.S.

industry, BIS enforces the EAR and helps to ensure that items which could be used to produce or deliver WMD do not fall into the most dangerous hands.

In the enforcement realm, the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) is the only Federal law enforcement agency that solely focuses on export control investigations. In 2011, according Assistant Secretary of Export Enforcement David W. Mills, OEE's investigations resulted in the conviction of 29 individuals, who received prison sentences totaling 572 months. There were criminal convictions of 10 companies and included \$20.2 million in criminal fines and \$2.1 million in forfeitures. Many of these cases related directly to WMD issues or exports to prohibited destinations, including Iran and Syria.

#### SOURCES

- 5 CFR 730.3
- <http://beta-www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/mission-statement>
- <http://beta-www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/speeches/97-about-bis/newsroom/speeches/speeches-2012/420-remarks-of-assistant-secretary-for-export-enforcement-david-w-mills-at-update-2012-conference>

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

- The BIS website offers a tremendous amount of information about the agency and its role in preventing the development, acquisition, and use of weapons of mass destruction by our adversaries ([www.bis.doc.gov](http://www.bis.doc.gov))
- BIS Enforcement Electronic Reading Room (<http://beta-efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/electronic-foia/index-of-documents/7-electronic-foia/227-export-violations>)
- BIS Parties of Concern: (<http://beta-www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern>)
- Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations ([www.cwc.gov](http://www.cwc.gov))
- Export Control Reform Initiative (<http://export.gov/ecr/index.asp>)

# Winter Workshop: 7-8 February 2013

## Day 1

Ms. Tina Carlile, PEL 05

This year's Winter Workshop, which focused on biological weapons (BW), was held at NDU on 7-8 February 2013. Members from PEL 03, 04, and 05 learned about the history, complexity, and current threat of BW from experts in the field.

After a warm welcome from Dr. John Reichart, Dr. Margaret Sloane, and MG Gregg Martin, NDU President, the Winter Workshop began with two historical cases. Dr. Jason Bannan, a clinical microbiologist at the FBI's Lab, explained 2001 anthrax attacks and the role of bioforensics in identifying the responsible party. Centering his discussion on the U.S. Government's response to the Amerithrax case, Dr. Bannan described how biological forensics has progressed. Afterwards, Dr. Sergei Popov, a professor at George Mason University and a former scientist in the Soviet Union's biological warfare program, gave PEL members an inside look at the Soviet BW program.

We spent lunch learning from Senior Mentors, after members of PEL 03 earned certificates of achievement for participating in over 90 hours of PEL activities, including Mr. Brian Mazanec, MAJ Lino Miani, LtCol Robert Pedersen and LtCol Todd Pennington. Afterwards, PEL members had lunch in small groups with the Senior Mentors. The Senior Mentors with their incredible experiences, reminded PEL members that the past, and the knowledge gained from it, should not be forgotten as the search for the path ahead continues.

After lunch, the discussion shifted gears to understanding and addressing the BW threat. Dr. Lawrence Kerr, from the National Counterproliferation Center, and Dr. Scott Cameron, from the National Counterterrorism Center, gave a classified briefing on the current BW threat and the role of the Intelligence Community in understanding it. PEL members were interested to learn that despite the magnitude of the BW threat, far more resources are given to other areas of WMD.

Mr. Leonard Izzo from the Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense in the

Pentagon explained the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process. Next, Dr. Seth Carus, Deputy Director of the WMD Center, explained the treaties, U.N. Security Council resolutions, international organizations, and multilateral efforts that constitute the BW nonproliferation regime. Dr. Carus's remarks gave PEL members insight into the complexities of international efforts addressing BW.

The day ended on a high note. Dr. Robert Kadlec, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Biodefense Policy on the Homeland Security Council, shared his insights into the BW threat and response from the perspective of the White House and Capitol Hill. He emphasized that what occurs in Washington is experiential – it matters what the leaders have lived through. Following Dr. Kadlec's remarks, a very strong showing of PEL members and conference presenters convened for a networking event at Station 4.

## Day 2

Maj Scott Stanford, PEL 05

After hearing about the wide range of biological threats on the first day of the Winter Workshop, the second day addressed the United States' ability to prepare for and respond to them. We benefited from another series of highly qualified speakers from across the federal government, as well as state and local officials, all of whom discussed the tools, policies, and organizations involved in the fight against biological threats.

Dr. Michael Kurilla and Dr. Lisa Kaplowitz began by explaining the role of the Department of Health and Human Services in public health preparedness. Their remarks covered a broad spectrum of threats ranging from infectious diseases to biological weapons. Next Dr. James Burans and Dr. Nicholas Bergman spoke about the mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), which was established after the 2001 anthrax attacks. Drs. Burans and Bergman described the unique nature of NBACC and how they entered uncharted territory

while developing their own scientific procedures to help crack the Amerithrax case. Of note, what took the FBI three to five years to investigate following the 2001 attacks would now take a matter of a few weeks to accomplish based on the advancements at NBACC. Most of us were surprised to learn that NBACC still analyzes samples from dozens of cases each year related to various forms of suspected biological threats. Next, Mr. Lance Brooks from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) outlined his agency's efforts to help other nations deal with potential biological threats. He described the numerous countries where the United States offers assistance in a range of activities, including improving security, accountability, and testing protocols for foreign biodefense programs.

Over lunch Dr. Daniel Gerstein from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) described the importance and challenge of working with agencies across the federal government, and perhaps more importantly, how the federal government works with local and state agencies to ensure they are adequately prepared to deal with biological threats. Afterwards, we learned about the roles of the State Department and Defense Department in the combating biological weapons arena from Mr. Chris Park and Dr. Ben Petro, respectively.

While the bulk of the Winter Workshop speakers were from federal agencies, we also heard from two state officials. Dr. Georges Benjamin, currently the Executive Director of the American Public Health Association, offered unique insight on the role of public health professionals across the United States. He was also the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene during the 2001 anthrax attacks and provided a first-hand account of the impact of the event on his state. Dr. Stephen Ostroff likewise presented a unique perspective, having served at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and then as a health official for the state of Pennsylvania. Both emphasized the vast improvements that have been made in recent years in the level of preparedness at the state level as well as the improved level of communication between federal, state, and local officials.

## Winter Workshop: Day 2, cont.

The 2013 PEL Winter wrapped up with insights from our Senior Mentors and comments on the future of the program from Dr. Sloane and Dr. Reichart. As usual, the PEL staff pulled together an all-star lineup of heavy hitters for this workshop, leaving us wanting more and looking forward to next year.

## Notes on Senior Mentors' Observations Dr. Margaret Sloane

One of the best parts of the Program for Emerging Leaders is the group of five senior mentors who attend PEL events and offer their wisdom. As I listened to their remarks at the end of Winter Workshop, I decided it would be good to share them with all of the PEL members, alums, and friends of the program who receive this newsletter. With their permission, here are my notes on their comments:

### AMBASSADOR ROBERT JOSEPH, Ph.D.

1. The Biological Weapons Convention is an important tool. It provides an essential norm for a framework of cooperation. But the BWC does not provide for the defense of the United States against Biological attack. Moreover, while we must fully comply with the terms of the treaty, we must not permit the U.S. process of compliance with the BWC to impede the development of U.S. defenses.

2. I was encouraged by the speakers today because we do appear to be making progress on understanding and protecting against the range of BW threats; however, I'm also cautious. There is a difference between awareness of the threat and developing an effective defense. And, while we may be better prepared than we have been in the past, we are still a long way from closing the gaps.

3. Nonproliferation and counterproliferation should be — and have traditionally been — non-partisan. The George W. Bush Administration built on the work of the Clinton Administration, and the Obama Administration has built on that of the Bush Administration. This area of national security needs to remain above partisanship.

### AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS

1. Nuclear weapons are not the same as biological weapons. The lessons that can be drawn from our experience with nuclear weapons are not applicable to biological weapons except at the highest policy levels.

2. Science is of great importance when it comes to biological threats and our responses to them.

3. There is great organizational complexity in the work against biological threats: six cabinet departments and within one department, the Department of Energy, there are several national labs. The diversity of membership in the Program for Emerging Leaders recognizes this complexity.

4. We can be spectacularly wrong. For example, there were insights about a Soviet biological weapons program during the Cold War, but we didn't understand the whole effort until people who were associated with the program defected and told us about the program. Another example is our failure to anticipate that a small attack by a biological weapon can be a weapon of mass disruption. Although many people may not die, such a weapon can cause significant disruption to society.

5. Ask yourself a question: why haven't there been more biological incidents? In Richard Danzig's view there are fashions in terrorist programs. If that is correct, and there is one successful attack, biological weapons may become the suicide vests of your time. You will probably have to deal with biological weapons both in state and terrorist hands.

6. There is enormous continuity between administrations on many aspects of countering WMD, including countering biological weapons. Essential continuity depends on a community that has enduring knowledge. Resist the occasional temptation to think that something is wrong with the last administration's stuff. There is essential continuity in national security because of the continuity of U.S. national interests.

7. Understand the impact of what Bob Kadlec described as "significant emotional experiences" like Vietnam and September 11<sup>th</sup> because of their impact on the people who lived through them. All of us are shaped by our experiences, and this is true for the people who will lead you.

### DR. SUSAN KOCH

1. Always listen to Ambassador Brooks.

2. I agree with Bob Joseph and Linton Brooks, national security policy should be, and often is, bipartisan. For example, the Obama Administration has the same position on the lack of verifiability of the Biological Weapons Convention as the Bush Administration had.

3. Here are some of the major themes I heard during the course of the Winter Workshop:

A. Many federal government agencies are involved in dealing with bio-logical threats. Everyone says they are working together, but I didn't conclude from the discussions of the last two days that this was actually happening.

B. Public health and defense agencies have to work together against biological threats. The public health linkage has been critical. Many of our international partners accept biodefense help more readily if the aid is presented as designed for public health.

C. Black swans, the term which is used to refer to low frequency events, are all over New Zealand. Taking the analogy a step further, risk therefore depends on where you are.

### DR. SETH CARUS

1. As we started implementing solutions, we started to realize that addressing the biological challenges was more complex than we realized. Somehow, no matter how much we did, it seemed like we were not making the progress we anticipated. We kept pouring water into the glass, but it always seemed to be a half-full glass, because we discovered that the glass was much bigger than we originally thought. Now we understand the challenges a lot better, but we are not necessarily better prepared to address them.

2. During the Winter Workshop, we have just skimmed the surface of the subject of biological threats and how to address them. We could have had an equally rich program by addressing a range of additional topics. For example, we had only one panel on preparedness.

3. Threat perception. We have never really understood the biological threat as a national security community. It was not until the waning days of the Cold War that we officially recognized that the Soviet Union had a massive biological program, which was the

## Notes on Senior Mentors' Observations, cont.

## Winter Workshop Observations Mr. Ken Rapuano, PEL Senior Mentor

largest intelligence failure of the Cold War according to one senior intelligence official who spoke at NDU. Equally disturbing, the Japanese extensively used biological weapons in the 1930s and 1940s, but we know almost nothing about it and we rarely talk about it; it is the dog that barked but which no one heard. Indeed, few know that the Germans used biological weapons in the United States during World War I and we knew nothing about it.

4. Dr. Benjamin made a really important comment about the political dimension of biodefense during his discussion of the Amerithrax case. At the Brentwood Postal Facility the workers, who were predominantly African American, had as a community a legacy of negative experiences with public health, including the Tuskegee experiments. This affected their reaction to the CDC recommendations on the use of antibiotics. Politics, not just partisan politics, permeates all homeland security actions and can affect how people react to government responses to biological threats.

### PIECES OF THE PUZZLE

There were many puzzle pieces presented during the 2013 PEL Winter Workshop. The challenge presented by the range of issues presented, is determining how they fit together. We need to recognize the key elements, the relationships between them, and how to factor, align, and integrate them to best achieve the most critical mission outcomes related to WMD threats. We've made progress since 9-11. We are more prepared than ever before, but we are still struggling to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts of these capabilities – this is particularly the case with the countering WMD mission. Simply put, we are not getting the level of unity of function that is needed to prevent and respond to evolving WMD threats.

The following are key issues I would suggest for your further consideration.

### INHERENT CHALLENGES

*Prioritization: Low Frequency/High Consequence Events.* It is critical to understand the dynamics and challenges associated with 'low frequency/high consequence threat' mission areas, such as WMD. By the very nature of these events, there are very few stakeholders (beyond those solely dedicated to WMD) who feel they can afford to prioritize efforts to prevent or respond to threats, which most hope and expect will not occur on their watches, over the more routine tasks they are more directly accountable for.

*Technology Trends: E.g. Bio.* The state of biotechnology and related expertise has evolved rapidly over past decades – to the point that offensive biological weapons capabilities that were limited to nation states 30 years ago, are increasingly within the grasp of non-state adversaries and individuals. As more and more actors have the capability to develop and employ biological agents, the likelihood of these weapons being used expands exponentially. In light of these trends, the conventional view held by many, that WMD will not be used in the future because it hasn't been used in the past, is increasingly and dangerously misplaced.

*Unintended Consequences: Risks/Benefits of Arms Control.* Intent-based arms control agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, can have positive effects by setting standards of behavior to those inclined to follow them. However, these 'bargains' come at a price. Due to the lack of effective means of verification, these agreements are highly prone to being used as a foil by violators conceal their pursuit of prohibited activities.

### UNITY-OF-EFFORT: UNDERSTANDING OF THE MISSION ENTERPRISE

Achieving unity-of-effort in a multi-mission, resource constrained environment is extremely difficult. It is essential to develop an understanding of the WMD mission enterprise. Key elements of this understanding include, the essential mission functions, respective roles, capabilities, and authorities of key stakeholders. Another fundamental, and too often under-emphasized component in the WMD mission space developing a deeper understanding of the 'mission context.' That is, how the various elements of the enterprise are likely to interface in the actual operating environment of a WMD crisis. Thankfully, we have very little actual experience with WMD events but, unfortunately, our efforts to simulate them in planning, exercises, and tabletops often fail to represent the unique technological, operational, and psychological dynamics of these events. As a result, our understanding of gaps, vulnerabilities, and capabilities which inform our priorities, is often compromised.

### TAKEAWAY

As you develop in the PEL program and subsequently progress in your careers, to be successful and effective, you will need to be aware of and substantively engaged with your counterparts working the other 'pieces of the puzzle.' The knowledge you acquire in this program, and the relationships you develop – with fellow PEL members, and counterparts throughout the mission – will be tremendous enablers to achieving the unity-of-effort that is so essential to protecting the nation against WMD threats.



**Mr. Ken Rapuano delivering his closing remarks at the 2013 Winter Workshop**

*Photo by Mrs. Katie Lewis, NDU AV*

# 2013 Winter Workshop in Pictures



**Top:** PEL members, Senior Mentors, and WMD Center staff

**Center:** CDR Amy Larson, PEL 05, and Mr. Chris Turner, PEL 05, catching up

**Bottom left:** Dr. Seth Carus, Mr. Leonard Izzo and Dr. Margaret Sloane

**Bottom right:** Dr. Lisa Kaplowitz from the Department of Health and Human Services addressing PEL members

*Photos by Mrs. Katie Lewis, NDU AV*



# 2013 Winter Workshop in Pictures, cont.



**Top left:** PEL Senior Mentors at the 2013 Winter Workshop: (from left to right) Ms. Elaine Bunn, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Ambassador Robert Joseph, Mr. Ken Rapuano, and Dr. Susan Koch

**Top right:** MG Gregg Martin, President of NDU, welcomes PEL members to NDU and discusses important leadership lessons

**Bottom left:** LtCol Todd Pennington, PEL 03, and Ms. Tina Car-lile, PEL 05, talking during a break

**Bottom right:** Dr. Georges Benjamin, Executive Director of the American Public Health Association, addressing PEL members on the second day of the Winter Workshop

*Photos by Mrs. Katie Lewis, NDU AV*



# 2013 Winter Workshop: Survey Says!

Dr. Margaret Sloane

Sixty percent of PEL members who attended the Winter Workshop responded to our survey. The candid feedback, especially in the space for additional comments, has given me a better understanding of what worked during this workshop and where we can improve.

Sixty-five percent of survey respondents said they did not have any expertise in biological weapons or the bio threat before the Winter Workshop, and almost everyone (93%) said they had learned something new from it. Everyone agreed that the workshop was a good introduction to BW and bio-threat-related issues, and almost everyone (96%) wanted to learn more about BW, the bio threat, and approaches to mitigating both. The most popular topic to learn about was the current bio threat (48%), and the least enjoyable topic to learn about was what some departments are doing to address it (55%). There was, of course, more we might have included. Respondents said they would have liked to have learned about the basics of biological weapons, responding to a bio-incident, agro-terrorism, the role of Special Forces in countering the threat, global pandemic diseases, and the connection between the strategic information that was presented and operational and tactical activities.

## READINGS

Most respondents found the amount of required reading appropriate; some made recommendations about the type and focus of the readings, including soliciting suggested readings from speakers and discussing the reading before or during the workshop with the Senior Mentors.

## FIRST DAY

On the first day, those who presented from history or their own experiences were the most popular speakers. This included Dr. Jason Bannan, who spoke about Anthrax; Dr. Sergei Popov, who talked about the Soviet BW program; and Dr. Bob Kadlec, who spoke about his experiences working on the Hill and in the White House. One PEL member noted, "Dr. Bannan and Dr. Popov both gave insights I can't imagine hearing anywhere else in my career." Another said Dr. Popov "highlighted in my mind that the threat is real. We couldn't find

a program that employed 60,000 people and it takes \$2 trillion to find one person mailing [anthrax-filled] letters. We have our work cut out for us."

## SECOND DAY

On the second day the panel about the view from the state and locals, featuring Dr. Georges Benjamin and Dr. Stephen Ostroff, was the favorite. One member noted, they "did a fantastic job of showing how state and local agencies are prepping daily, but also the gaps in the BW area for them." Another said, "It was fascinating to get the HHS and the state/local perspective. You don't always get those viewpoints when you discuss WMD." Another observed that the speakers' presentations "illuminated a disjointed bridge between federal and state governments."



## NETWORKING

Almost all respondents reported that they met a PEL member whom they had not met before during the workshop, and a bit more than half (57%) said they would be in touch with that person later about a work-related matter. Seventy-two percent of respondents said they attended the networking event at Station 4. From the comments about the evening, it is clear people would have preferred a quieter and larger venue to facilitate conversation, but many appreciated the restaurant's proximity to NDU.

## LOOKING AHEAD

*More time.* Not surprisingly some people felt they were talked at too much over the course of two days and did not have enough time to interact. A majority found they did not have enough time to talk to the Senior Mentors (53%) and speakers (68%), but

three quarters reported they had sufficient opportunity to meet and interact with each other and WMD Center staff. When asked what changes they would make to Winter Workshop, PEL members suggested creating more time to spend with the Senior Mentors and speakers, both during Q&A and in less formal settings, like breaks and a reception.

*Winter Workshop 2014.* Sixty-two percent of the survey's respondents had attended a Winter Workshop in the past. Of them exactly half wished we had kept the tabletop exercise (TTX) as part of the agenda and only 16% missed having an evening keynote speaker at the end of the first day. The response to the plan to focus on one category of weapon of mass destruction in subsequent Winter Workshops was overwhelmingly positive.

Looking ahead to next year's Winter Workshop on chemical weapons (CW) and threats, members made suggestions about both content and form. With regard to content they suggested a descriptive briefing about chemical weapons for a non-technical audience, learning about the birth of CW, chemical smuggling, negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and al-Qaida's ability to deploy CW. Suggestions about the organization of the next Winter Workshop included holding an interactive event or TTX; discussing a current issue and how to address it; and allowing for interaction with senior leaders, including breakout sessions after speakers.

*Future events.* More than half the respondents who live in the National Capital Region (NCR) said they would be interested in a leadership dinner (52%) or a day-long agency or department visit (59%). For those living outside the NCR, approximately 40% have the ability to connect to events via secure phone, open phone line, SECRET video teleconference, or UNCLASS video teleconference. While we have not used these means in the past, we will certainly try to incorporate them in the future.

Thanks again to all of you who were able to attend the Winter Workshop and took the time to provide feedback through the survey. You have given us a lot to consider, and we look forward to next year's Winter Workshop and making it even better than this year's was!